INTRODUCTION

What does it mean to live outside China but “be Chinese” in the late twentieth century? In pursuit of answers to this question, I have examined both writings on the Overseas Chinese and the more general literature of ethnicity. My own work on Overseas Chinese has tended to focus on the Philippines and on mainland North America—that is, on Canada and the mainland United States (Wickberg, 1965; Wickberg et al., 1982; Wickberg, 1988). Work by other people on Overseas Chinese tends also to focus on individual countries, not unreasonably, since the living conditions of Overseas Chinese exhibit important variations from one country to another. More general studies of ethnicity, too, with few exceptions (e.g., Banton, 1983), usually examine several ethnic groups within a single country or a very few countries. The idea of taking one group and looking at it comparatively in several national and regional situations seems not very common.

In my most recent work I have been heading in the direction of broader cross-national and cross-regional comparisons of Overseas Chinese ethnicity. I attempted to compare Overseas Chinese ethnicity in North America with that in Southeast Asia (Wickberg, 1988). These two geographic regions are almost never compared in research on the Overseas Chinese. Yet in my recent study I found that, despite tremendous differences in cultural, social, and political contexts and in immigration history, there are some broadly important similarities between Chinese people in the two regions. I argued that organizational trends could give us some rough ideas about the state of ethnicity in Overseas Chinese communities. I did not argue that an Overseas Chinese community with many Chinese organizations was somehow “more Chinese” than a community with few. Rather, I said that an increase in the number of organizations since, say, World War II (a watershed date in Overseas Chinese history) and the development of certain kinds of organizations would indicate that assimilation was not occurring. It would also, I believed, give us some ideas about what was taking place in terms of ethnicity.

My general findings were that since 1945, first, in almost every country in Southeast Asia and North America there has been an increase in the number of Overseas Chinese organizations. Second, in both regions there has been a decline in the relative importance of China-derived political organizations (the Guomindang, Chee Kung Tang, etc.). Third, there has been a general increase in the number of youth-related and professional-related organizations. And fourth, there has been an increase in religious organizations, whether of major Asian religions in Southeast Asia or non-mainstream Christianity in mainland North America. Based on these and other findings, my conclusion was that what is happening in both Southeast Asia and North America is not assimilation but various kinds of integration (Wickberg, 1988).

In the present paper I intend to shift the focus to five places in the Pacific region. Two of them are Asian, though very different from one another: the Philippines and Japan. Two others are mainland North American and quite similar to each other: Canada and the United States. The other is Hawai‘i, which appears to have at once characteristics found in Asian and in North American Overseas Chinese contexts, but also some others of its own.

In this paper, as in my 1988 paper, I wish to point out five kinds of Overseas Chinese organizational needs: (1) competitive interest articulation; (2) social welfare; (3) expression (as of religious sentiments or social status); (4) “resinification”—that is, a concern for reviving and transmitting aspects of Chinese culture, particularly to younger generations; and (5) negotiation, meaning negotiation with the larger society in the interests of the Overseas Chinese community.

Finally, in this paper I will give more than usual attention to the active role of China in contributing to Overseas Chinese ethnicity. Usually, changes in Overseas Chinese ethnicity are seen to be associated with changes in the local environment. I will argue that it is of equal importance to analyze changes in China itself and in its relationship to the individual host countries where Overseas Chinese are found.
As China changes and redefines itself culturally, the meanings of “China” and “Chinese” change for Overseas Chinese. And China’s changing economic and political relationships both with the Overseas Chinese directly and with their host countries also condition Overseas Chinese ethnicity.

**ETHNIC REDEFINITION: STIMULI AND POSSIBILITIES**

In my opinion, Overseas Chinese ethnicity—whether individual or collective—is extremely complex. It varies with time, space, circumstance, and situation. It is shaped initially by the Chinese subethnic group from which a given person or group of Chinese emigrants came: Cantonese, Hokkiens, Hakka, etc. One’s conception of “Chineseness” is further shaped by the particular overseas context and comparisons therein with other groups and other cultural norms. It is still further molded by changes in conceptions of China at the national level. Once China is thought of—by both Chinese in China and Chinese overseas—as at least prospectively a modern nation, “modernity” becomes a necessary component of “Chineseness.” It is not enough to be “Chinese” in some traditional way; it becomes necessary to be both culturally Chinese and culturally modern. This way of looking at Overseas Chinese ethnicity is, it seems to me, more accurate than assertions about the attractiveness of general “modernity” culture to the Overseas Chinese (e.g., Coughlin, 1960, chap. 9; Yamada, 1983, 33).

It seems to me that as long as there is some incentive, pressure, or concern about remaining “Chinese,” the attractiveness of “modernity” will be thought of by Overseas Chinese as the attractiveness of Chinese modernity. For Overseas Chinese, as indeed for all Chinese since 1900, the cultural question remains how to be both “modern” and “Chinese.” There may indeed be a universal, transcendent modern culture, but that is, I believe, a nonissue to most Overseas Chinese. The issue is whether to remain a modern Chinese or hyphenated Chinese (Chinese-Filipino, Chinese-Canadian, etc.), if the possibility is there, or to become an unhyphenated modern Filipino, Canadian, or whatever. It is either Chinese modernity or someone else’s modernity or a combination thereof.

What, then, are the stimuli, incentives, pressures, and concerns that cause Overseas Chinese individuals and groups to redefine their ethnicity? “Redefine” may not be the best word here, since it seems to imply a necessarily rational process of decision and selection. It might be better to speak instead of situations and circumstances that raise the question of ethnicity in ways that cannot be ignored.

The first of these is replenishment of the Overseas Chinese community in a given country. Newcomers from China or other Overseas Chinese communities provide alternative examples of “Chineseness”—ones that contrast and may conflict with the prevailing conceptions in the local Chinese community. The extreme cases occur when a large influx of newcomers arrives after a long period of accommodation or even “creolization” of a given community. One classic example of this is the Chinese mestizos and the new wave of Chinese immigration in the Philippines after 1850 (Wickberg, 1965); another is the *peranakans* of Java and the large influx of newcomer *totoks* from China in 1900 (Williams, 1960). A good post–World War II example is furnished by Canada, where twenty-five years of nonreplenishment (1923–47) has been followed by forty years of replenishment (Wickberg et al., 1982). This kind of process produces not only social cleavages along local vs. outsider-newcomer lines, but cultural competition as well—competition that the newcomers, if numerous, with their more recent version of Chinese culture, are likely to win.

The importance of replenishment to the maintenance of ethnicity is well known, but it has its limits as an explanation of ethnicity maintenance and resurgence. In the postwar era, while mainland North American Chinese communities have experienced massive replenishment, Asian Overseas Chinese communities have had almost none. Yet in both Japan and the Philippines (and generally throughout Southeast Asia), ethnic organizations have continued to proliferate (Wickberg, 1988; *Huaqiaozhi Riben*, 1965, 200–223; *Huaqiaozhi: Congzhi*, 1978, 214–23, 241). In the prewar era these positions were reversed; Asian Overseas Chinese communities were steadily replenished but North American ones almost not at all. Yet mainland North American Chinese communities continued to produce new ethnic organizations (Wickberg, 1980). And in Hawai‘i, where it might have seemed that the Chinese community of the 1930s was on its way to assimilation (Glick, 1938), that community began to produce Chinese clan associations, stoutly maintained its Chinese schools, and created Chinese Buddhist associations by the 1950s (Glick, 1980, 288; Chou, 1954, 33–35; Lau, 1975, 84; Young, 1973, 71, 75; Young, 1972).

A second stimulus or reminder of one’s “Chineseness” is what I have called “visibility.” I think of this as being of different kinds: physical, economic, cultural, and nominal. Physical visibility varies in degree across a spectrum of the five areas we are considering. Thus, in Canada and the mainland United States, people of Chinese background are conspicuously visible in physical terms, with accompanying cultural assumptions about them on the part of non-Chinese. Physical visibility is important in North American society and will be for a long time to come. For a North American Chinese questions of ethnicity are heavily and unavoidably influenced by having a “Chinese face.” In Hawai‘i and the Philippines, physical visibility is somewhat less salient than in North America, and in Japan there is enough overlap in physical appearance between Chinese and Japanese that many Chinese—especially long-term residents—can “pass” as Japanese if they wish.

Economic visibility is strongest in the Philippines and all through Southeast Asia. The occupational concentration of people of Chinese background (until quite recently) in cer-
tain key economic positions has been as important to their visibility and accompanying stereotypes as has physical visibility in North America (Wickberg, 1988). In Japan, some Chinese are engaged in international commerce and others are Tokyo intellectuals and professionals. But these are hardly occupations monopolized by Chinese. And the other characteristic Chinese occupations—restaurant owner, barber, tailor, and the like (Yamada, 1983, 27)—are not ones that readily excite envy among non-Chinese. Roughly the same may be said of the Chinese occupations in the mainland United States and Canada. Whether the status of many Hawaiian Chinese as professionals and business owners excites envy is a question I leave to others to answer. Even in the Philippines, where economic visibility is most important, the recent easing of policy restrictions on Chinese citizenship and access to professional occupations is likely to result in some deconcentration of Chinese economic activity, thereby reducing the effects of economic visibility on Chinese conceptions of themselves.

Cultural visibility, unlike physical and economic visibility, is entirely voluntary. Little can be done about physical appearance, and economic visibility is often conditioned by host-society policies and restrictions. But nobody requires the Chinese overseas to maintain a Chinese-style family system, eat Chinese food, practice certain Chinese arts, or engage in Chinese religious practices. When visibly done, these practices may mark those doing them as Chinese. But over time Chinese cultural practices have become increasingly acceptable in host societies, and some—Chinese food, for example—are shared with other groups everywhere. More about this below.

Nominal visibility—that is, visibility because of possessing a Chinese or Chinese-derived name—is found everywhere. But it is not important everywhere. In the Philippines, where occupation seems to be most important, possession of a Chinese or Chinese-derived surname has not been a major impediment to social acceptance and mobility. Thus Tan, Lim, and Yap have become Filipino surnames, and some major leaders have had names like Ongpin, Teehankee, and Cojuangco. Nominal visibility may be of greatest importance in Japan just because in so many other ways the Chinese are, or can be, almost invisible. Physical and cultural overlaps between China and Japan and the relative unimportance of Chinese occupational patterns in Japan leave names as the major distinction. Even those can be concealed, if desired, by taking a Japanese name—sometimes the mother’s surname, if she is Japanese (Zang and Jiang, 1959, 131–32; Sugawara, 1979, 228). Baseball star Oh Sadaharu has at least a Japanese personal name. But academics like Dai Kokki (Dai Guohui) and Ko Sekai (Xu Shijie) simply render their Chinese names according to the Japanese sound of the characters, which produces names most Japanese would recognize as un-Japanese.

Visibility aside, there are certain economic advantages and disadvantages to being Chinese or being so considered by others, and these too raise questions about one’s ethnicity. Maintenance of a Chinese identity facilitates access to occupational and trading networks and the jobs that go with them. Some of these networks are internal to a given country and reflect the conditions of classic minority occupational concentrations. Others are part of international Overseas Chinese trading and other business networks. Always important in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong, these networks have recently extended and enlarged their importance in places like North America. To be part of these business networks requires language and cultural skills and, these days, usually a business education as well. Being Chinese may also be an advantage in seeking international employment with a non-Chinese firm. It has been said that Japanese companies sometimes hire Overseas Chinese in Japan not for trading relationships with China but as mediators in their trading relationships with Overseas Chinese networks in Southeast Asia (Sugawara, 1979, 166–70).

Some of the economic disadvantages of being or seeming to be Chinese are well known. Before World War II job discrimination was universal in mainland North America. Sometimes it took the form of professional codes that effectively excluded Chinese Americans or Chinese Canadians from certain professions. Thus, in western Canada, British Columbia’s lawyers, pharmacists, and accountants maintained codes that excluded from their professions anyone not on the provincial voters list—knowing that Chinese had already been excluded from that list. Hence, the first Chinese Canadian lawyers were not called to the bar until the 1940s (Wickberg et al., 1982, 82, 205). In the Philippines, the nationalization of certain commercial activities (rice and corn trading and retail business) excluded Chinese, for whom attainment of citizenship was extremely difficult. Certain professions were also out of bounds for Chinese until recently.

Although these restrictions are disappearing in North America and the Philippines, they continue in Japan. Access to nationally funded universities is limited to Japanese citizens. Citizenship is not impossible to obtain (Sugawara, 1979, 201, 304ff). But even with citizenship and a degree from a prestigious national university—or without citizenship and a degree from an excellent private university—employment interviews are often traumatic. If the applicant’s resume reveals or suggests that he may have non-Japanese ancestors, his chances for employment—with the government or a private firm—are likely to drop sharply. Thus, in Japan one sees characteristic patterns often observed elsewhere (particularly in earlier decades): Overseas Chinese with higher education retreating to Chinatown and ethnic occupations because of the traumas of competition outside. In Japan, this translates into Overseas Chinese “defected salarymen” who, in doubt about their future in the Japanese work world, give it up and withdraw to the safety of ethnic occupations (Sugawara, 1979, 176ff; Zang and Jiang, 1959, 108).

Besides the advantages and disadvantages of being Chinese in terms of jobs, there are, as conditioning factors,
questions about the cultural opportunities: can one be anything else but Chinese in the country one is in? How attractive and accessible is the dominant culture of that country? How easy are intermarriage and citizenship? What cultural accommodations are possible? Is hyphenated status (Chinese-American, Chinese-Filipino) culturally acceptable?

In the Philippines, intermarriage has long been widely practiced, with important results in the formation of modern Philippine society. But until the last fifteen years, Philippine citizenship was almost impossible for any but the richest Chinese to obtain. Anyone else whose patrilineal ancestors were Chinese was classified (until the mid-1970s) as a citizen of the Republic of China or Taiwan, whether he wished it or not. Place of birth and personal commitment did not matter. In a grotesque example of where such a policy could lead, Quintin and Rizal Yuyitung, Philippine-born publishers of a mildly left-wing Chinese newspaper in Manila, were abducted in 1970, with the connivance of the Marcos government, to stand trial in Taiwan on charges of sedition against their country of citizenship (New York Times, May 25, 1970, 11).

Since the mid-1970s it has become much easier for Philippine Chinese to acquire Philippine citizenship and there has been a rush to do so (Wang, 1976b, 256; HJN, 1984–85, 195). This is not surprising since, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese community has not been replenished by new immigration and hence is made up largely of people born in the Philippines. Another sign that Filipino attitudes toward the Chinese are changing is the recent visit of President Aquino to her “ancestral village” in South China during her trip to China in the spring of 1988. Members of the important segment of the Filipino elite that is partly Chinese in origin used to attempt to distance themselves from the Chinese part of their background. They did this by joking about having pigtailed ancestors (thereby implying they had a great distance since then), by publicly maintaining ignorance of things Chinese, or even by professing some hostility to the Chinese. President Aquino’s visit—aside from its ceremonial importance to China-Philippines relations—is a kind of symbolic statement that it is now acceptable to treat one’s Chinese background seriously (Asiaweek, April 29, 1988, 10). After her return to Manila, President Aquino joined Cardinal Jaime Sin, who is also of Chinese descent, in supporting a television documentary and stage play project on the Chinese heritage in the Philippines (Tulay, October 16, 1988, 1, 4, 12). Although popular attitudes toward the Chinese will not change overnight (Mei Nan, 1988, 5; Feng Nan, 1988, 4), apparent changes in Filipino elite attitudes may now make it possible for “Chinese-Filipino” or some other kind of hyphenated status to be culturally acceptable in the Philippines. The rise of the Kaisa group of young Chinese in the 1970s and 1980s is particularly significant because its members are committed to integration and to the use of the term “Chinese-Filipino.”

In some places—Canada, Hawai‘i, and the mainland United States—multiculturalism is accepted, in one way or another. Citizenship is by place of birth, rather than by descent, and intermarriage is increasingly accepted (especially, of course, in Hawai‘i). Hyphenated accommodations are acceptable, and indeed these are the lands that invented the terms that are most often used for such accommodations.

Japan, as usual, is another story. Most of the Overseas Chinese in Japan either were born there or are long-term residents, very much in touch with the Japanese environment (Yamada, 1983; Sugawara, 1979, 164, 180–84). Citizenship is by descent, and naturalization, though not always easy to get, is accessible. Decisions about seeking it often accompany decisions about intermarriage (Sugawara, 1979, 175–76, 189). There appears to be a small but steady flow of naturalization applications (Sugawara, 1979, 203), but there are sometimes blips influenced by political changes. Thus, when Premier Tanaka went to Beijing in the early 1970s and Japan’s relations with the mainland were subsequently normalized, applications for naturalization increased (Sugawara, 1979, 304ff).

I have seen no statistics on intermarriage, but in one Chinese school in Japan (perhaps an extreme case) it was found that the parents of 35 percent of the children were mixed couples, usually a Chinese father and a Japanese mother (Zang and Jiang, 1959, 131–32). Some Japanese writers also speak of the frequency of intermarriage (Yamada, 1983, 12ff).

But Japan is famous for its homogeneity of population and for what one might call its “uniculturalism.” In common with the Scandinavian countries and some other parts of the world, Japan is a very homogeneous society. Much has been written recently about the Japanese treatment of the Koreans in Japan, the largest cultural minority there. The Chinese in Japan, with a stable, unreplenished population of slightly over fifty thousand, are a tiny group in comparison to the Koreans, who are ten to fifteen times as numerous (Sugawara, 1979, 330–31). Like the Koreans, the Chinese are subject to fingerprinting and demands by the Japanese police to see identification documents. These legal requirements, long in existence, have recently been renewed in the new Alien Registration Law (Sing Tao International, June 1, 1988). Given these conditions, it is difficult to imagine that any kind of hyphenated accommodation (like “Chinese-Japanese”) will be acceptable in Japan.

Japanese have accepted Chinese food enthusiastically. Indeed, there has been a boom in Chinese food in Japan since World War II, and one of the things that keeps alive Japan’s only Chinatown—Zhonghua Street in Yokohama—is the restaurants and the Chinese ambience they maintain for Japanese patrons. But even here, as Japanese cooks become more skilled in Chinese cooking (Sugawara, 1979, 130–40), it may be possible to have the Chinese ambience without having the Chinese.

Finally, as an influence on ethnicity, there is the “China factor.” The attractions of local culture are countered by
those of China and of various versions of Overseas Chinese culture. Here, the “modernity” element must certainly be involved. On an individual basis, the Chinese in the Philippines may be pulled toward the familiar Philippine environment but at the same time toward the values and practices of the Chinese family system. In such a case, the relative modernity of Filipino versus Chinese may become critical. In the Philippines, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, it is possible for Chinese to think of Overseas Chinese culture as somehow more “modern” than the cultures native to Southeast Asia. If one emphasizes the possession of business and technical skills as an aspect of modernity, it can certainly appear that way. This is quite different from the situation in Japan, North America, and Hawai‘i. In these places it is difficult for people of Chinese background to feel any sense of greater modernity despite the achievements of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Overseas Chinese (see, e.g., Yamada, 1983, 29, 33).

When speaking of Overseas Chinese ethnicity at the individual level it is, I believe, valuable to draw upon the idea of “conscious models.” Here I am following the work of the anthropologist Barbara Ward, an unusually astute observer of Chinese society (Ward, 1965). I would argue that Overseas Chinese draw upon several models of “Chineseness.” These models are likely to be urban centered because this makes them more readily applicable to the usually urban situation of Overseas Chinese. I believe that such models come from personal experience and are therefore as varied as this experience may be. To be urban and to be “Chinese” may be to be like people in the market town near one’s “home village” in China (for anyone old enough to have been there); or like those in the county town; or the provincial capital; or Amoy, Taibei, or Hong Kong. These models not only are numerous and varied in space but change over time.

The critical point is that we recognize that varieties of a modern Chinese urban culture and society grew up in the coastal treaty port cities and Hong Kong in the early twentieth century. The most conspicuous descendant of this treaty port culture and society is contemporary Hong Kong. The availability of this kind of modern urban Chinese identity to Overseas Chinese is extremely important. In its most attractive form, this model says that “Chinese” means a successful urban business or professional person whose cultural commitments are “modern.” One might go beyond this to imagine an ultimate, all-purpose model for Overseas Chinese ethnicity: a modern, family-oriented, Chinese-looking person who speaks Chinese (probably Mandarin); is successful in various pursuits, economic and noneconomic; and has skills in certain Chinese arts that are acceptable abroad (Wickberg, 1988).

The emergence in recent decades of models of Chinese modernity—most conspicuously Hong Kong, but secondarily Taiwan and now, incipiently, the mainland—is extremely important. In part these developments are the result of economic growth and involvement in international trade and finance. But it is necessary to remember that there is a long history of self-redefinition in China, beginning about 1900, that bears on the conceptions of “modern Chineseness” that Chinese people—both at home and abroad—have today.

At the beginning of the twentieth century Chinese governments began to promote modernization, and both government and private individuals and groups began to see China in a worldwide comparative context. This inevitably raised questions about how China could be modern, as defined by the most technically advanced countries, and also remain Chinese. These questions were brought up again, with dramatic force, in the May Fourth Movement that centered on the year 1919. This second attempt to define China as still China but also modern was followed, as a result of political changes, by a third effort in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The Guomindang government of Chiang Kai-shek, newly arrived in power, presented its version of a modernity suitable to China. After 1949 the Communists had their turn on the mainland, while Chiang's supporters had a chance for a new vision on Taiwan. Finally, the Modernization Program on the mainland is yet another vision of a modern China, not quite like any of the others.

All these visions and versions have included efforts to overcome what is seen as the parochialism of region or locality orientation. Since the 1920s Mandarin has been the language of the schools in China and Chinese governments have attempted—with varying success—to encourage its use in Chinese schools abroad. Not only have there been persistent efforts to encourage nationalism, as opposed to parochialism, but national-level culture has also been promoted; for example, the Mandarin language has been presented as superior to any regional or local dialect or language.

In Overseas Chinese communities, the major nonfamilial institution of ethnic maintenance since 1900 has been the Chinese school. In Asia, Chinese schools have been full time, with curricula representing compromises between the interests of aid-giving Chinese governments, the restrictions of host-society governments, and the aims of the Overseas Chinese themselves (Blaker, 1970). On this subject, as on some others, the Philippines represent an extreme case. As part of their close relationship between 1949 and 1975, the Philippine government let the Taiwan government determine the content of Chinese education in the Philippines and thereby define the “Chinese culture” to be taught there (Blaker, 1970, 252). But since 1975 the Chinese schools in the Philippines, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, have been in retreat, the object of government restrictions on content. In the Philippines, Chinese-language instruction has now been reduced to one hundred minutes per day (Chen Lieh-fu, 1979, chaps. 18–19, pp. 455, 457).

In Japan the uniform affiliation of Chinese schools with Taiwan ended in 1952, when several schools split into pro-Taiwan and pro-mainland groups. Competing schools were then formed. The relative enrollments of each (and thus the
relative numbers of students receiving the Taiwan and mainland versions of modern Chinese cultural instruction) appear to have followed the international political fortunes of the two Chinese governments. As Taiwan’s international political status declined in the 1970s and as Japan changed its affiliation to the mainland, Chinese students in Taiwan-affiliated schools in Japan transferred in substantial numbers either to mainland-affiliated schools or to Japanese schools (Sugawara, 1979, 186, 255ff, 262, 274; Zang and Jiang, 1959, 34–35, 105).

Unlike the Asian Chinese schools, the North American “after-school” Chinese schools were always seen as supplementary to existing local educational institutions. Where in Asia Chinese schools were intended to provide both job-skill training and Chinese cultural instruction, in North America they provided only the latter. Before 1945, however, attendance at North American Chinese schools was a serious business in job terms, too. The relatively few children present in Chinese communities of that era could expect to get few jobs outside of Chinatown, and Chinatown jobs required competence in Chinese (Wickberg, 1988).

After 1945 the opening of job opportunities outside of Chinatown made these schools and their instruction seem, for a time, to be unnecessary. More recently, as prospects for trade with China have developed and as an interest in resification has appeared in some North American Chinese communities, new cultural centers and other organizations have sponsored language and cultural instruction either in Cantonese or in Mandarin (Wickberg, 1988).

In the United States public schools and universities have been the loci since the 1960s of Asian American Studies programs. These have added a new dimension to Chinese Americans’ perceptions of themselves because they focus on the common experiences of all Asian Americans and stress the value of common political action.

The Asian American identity of Chinese Americans is probably without parallel elsewhere. In the milder sociopolitical climate of Canada, where there has been no Black Power Movement to act as a spearhead, ethnic consciousness movements of the last twenty years have been the private causes of individual groups under a government policy of multiculturalism.

Even in Hawai‘i, a part of the United States, the Asian American definition lacks the sharp bite of its mainland counterpart. Instead, the striking things (to me, at least) about resification in Hawai‘i are how early it began to be of concern and how little it seems to have been influenced by community replenishment (which has been rather slight). The pattern of Chinese American association formation ever since the 1940s suggests a strong community interest in the preservation and transmission of Chinese culture (United Chinese Society, 1984). To an outside observer, the picture appears to be one of a community so successful at adapting to its environment that it began to fear disappear-
to speak of Hawai‘i in these terms as more like Asia than like mainland North America—a land of mostly huayi. Needless to say, these perceptions of overseas communities as made up of huqiao, huaren, and huayi have influenced and will continue to influence Chinese governments’ policies and expectations regarding Chinese people outside of China.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

The foregoing has been a rather impressionistic set of comments and suggestions, based on wide reading and considerable thought but, given the subject, inevitably difficult to put on firmly documented ground. In what follows I will briefly summarize the nature of the Chinese populations in the areas discussed, introduce some additional considerations that bear on ethnicity, and finish with some rash predictions.

First, what size populations have we been talking about? Estimates of “ethnic Chinese” populations are inherently difficult to use because the methods by which they are made are almost never fully specified. In the case of the mainland United States we are speaking of a population of perhaps one million or more (HJN, 1984–85, 366). A common estimate for the Philippines is six hundred thousand. The Canadian Chinese population is now at least three hundred thousand and may be approaching the size of that in the Philippines. Japan and Hawai‘i are the small ones, each with somewhere in the range of twenty-five to seventy-five thousand (HJN, 1984–85, 265, 266). In each case, the Chinese population represents a small fraction of the total population of the larger society.

Mainland American Chinese tend now to be clustered in such major urban and suburban centers as metropolitan New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Houston. Canada’s Chinese population is even more concentrated. The twin poles, metropolitan Toronto and Vancouver, dominate and there are several much smaller centers. As in the United States, satellite Chinatowns proliferate in the metropolitan areas. Hawai‘i’s Chinese population is now found almost entirely in the Honolulu area. The Philippine Chinese population, although widely distributed in major cities, retains a focal point in Manila Chinatown and the Metro Manila area. In Japan, Chinese in significant numbers have long been found only in Kobe, Yokohama, Tokyo, and Osaka.

There is considerable variation in the subethnicity of these various Chinese communities. In mainland North America, what were once solidly Sei Yap Cantonese communities with Sam Yap and Zhungshan minorities have now accepted large numbers of newcomers from elsewhere—especially Taiwan, in the case of the United States, and Hong Kong, in the case of Canada. In Hawai‘i, the long-standing pattern of Zhungshan majority and Hakka minority is still in place because later migration from Hong Kong and Taiwan, unlike that in mainland North America, has been small relative to the size of the community as a whole. The Philippines, as before, has a Hokkien community with an important Cantonese minority. The Chinese community in Japan, though small, is quite diverse. Before World War II it was made up of Guangtong (Cantonese), Fuzhou (Hokkiens), and Jiangnan people from the Ningbo-Shanghai region—migrants who had followed long-established trading routes from China to Japan. Then, as a result of decisions by the victorious allied forces, the Taiwanese residing in Japan changed status overnight in 1945 from Japanese colonials to members of the Chinese minority group. In so doing, they doubled the size of the Overseas Chinese group in Japan and became the leading component of it, 50 percent of the total (Sugawara, 1979, 110; Zang and Jiang, 1959, 5, 12–17).

Despite their differences, the Chinese communities in all the areas we are looking at share a concern about resinification. Perhaps that is in response to the greater opportunities now available to Chinese in the larger society in North America, or fears of the cultural effects of naturalization, or an awareness of the effects on the huayi of the Philippines of lessened contact with China (See, 1976, esp. 181–90). Whatever the reason, the number of “national arts” and other youth organizations is impressive. Some of these, like martial arts groups, are often attached to some of the oldest, most parochial Chinese organizations in the Philippines and in Canada (Wickberg, 1988). One wonders to what extent such organizations may be able to preserve local, subethnic versions of Chinese culture abroad, or whether resinification of Overseas Chinese communities inevitably means “mandariniﬁcation” in all aspects of culture (cf. Yamada, 1983, 19). Perhaps it is not surprising that when the Vancouver Chinese Cultural Centre created a Chinese garden on its premises recently, it chose a national type, a Suzhou-style garden, and named the garden after Sun Yat-sen, a Cantonese with national ambitions and achievements. Future struggles may be not between national and parochial culture but between national modern Chinese and international modern Chinese culture.

It is this question that comes up when we observe the sharing of Chinese culture with non-Chinese that is promoted in some Overseas Chinese communities. Vancouver’s Suzhou Chinese Garden could only have been built by enlisting the money and voluntary efforts of many non-Chinese. The Vancouver Chinese Cultural Centre is itself an organization whose membership is open to non-Chinese while it simultaneously promotes Chinese culture to the Chinese. Thereby, what belongs most intimately to the Chinese also belongs, in another sense, to the non-Chinese. This advertising and sharing of aspects of Chinese culture with non-Chinese is not so new; it has been practiced in Hawai‘i for some time, and to a lesser extent in the mainland United States. The spirit of the Vancouver Cultural Centre’s approach was echoed in a recent talk by Rizal Yuyitung, who is now back in the Philippines. Speaking to a group of Philippine Chinese writers, he argued that the way for Philippine Chinese
to integrate while retaining Chinese culture was to share that culture. In other words, one strengthens one’s own possession of the culture by sharing it (Yu-yitung, 1988, 16–18). One of the most interesting developments in Vancouver (and probably elsewhere in North America) has been the rise of Chinese martial arts clubs, which attract both young immigrants from Hong Kong and refined third-generation Chinese Canadians. They also attract young White Canadians of both sexes (Wickberg, 1988).

Finally, here are some perhaps rash predictions. First, it seems to me that, given the proportions of its ethnic composition, Hawai‘i is not likely to be a model for the future development of these other areas in the Pacific region. Its own degree and kind of integration are unique within the region and seem unlikely to be duplicated. If anything, Hawai‘i’s Chinese community, unless replenished on a much larger scale than it has been up to now, may become a creolized relic with a somewhat anachronistic definition of cultural “Chineseness.”

Second, integration with workable ethnic maintenance—seemingly so far advanced in Hawai‘i—seems to have good prospects in both Canada and the mainland United States and to at least be possible in the Philippines, but not in Japan. What I see in Japan is a continuation of what that community has been: neither integrated nor assimilated—a source of “cultural friction” to Japan (Yamada, 1983, 25). The critical factor is change in the basic Japanese practice of holding anything alien at arm’s length. Such a change is unlikely to occur soon. Brief replenishment of the community may occur when Hong Kong becomes part of mainland China and when there are definite indications about the future of Taiwan. That may revive feelings of “Chineseness.”

But at the other extreme there is the continued pull toward assimilation. In Japan the Chinese schools remain, as they were, full-time operations. But it has become common for parents to send children to Japanese high school following Chinese elementary school, in order to equip them for university study or the job market (Sugawara, 1979, 23–33; Blaker, 1970). Meanwhile, continued intermarriage also pulls in the direction of assimilation.

But without basic changes in Japanese attitudes it is likely that neither assimilation nor effective ethnic maintenance will be possible, and Japan’s Overseas Chinese will remain caught in the predicament they are now in.

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